Society for the Promotion of Human Rights in Employment

UNION STRATEGIES FOR THE GLOBALISATION OF LABOUR RIGHTS: THE SOCIAL CLASE PROPOSAL

* Cardiff Professorial Fellow, Cardiff University, and Visiting Professor, National Key Centre in Industrial Relations, Monash University

** Professor in International Business, Department of Management, Monash University

*** Research Fellow, National Key Centre in Industrial Relations, Monash University

The trade union demand that a labour rights clause should be included in international trade agreements elicits the response that linking trade and rights is unacceptable; trade instruments should not be used to assure respect for rights and the demand is supposedly a Northern ploy not supported by Southern workers. Reporting on four International Trade Secretariats and the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, we argue that these charges have little warrant. The union movement has embraced a complex pattern of global political engagement that is sensitive to these claims and designed to capitalise on the divergent strengths of labour.

The international labour movement has called for "a series of practical steps to incorporate enforceable core labour standards into concrete actions by the WTO [World Trade Organization]". (ICFTU 2000a, p. 1) Recently, this call has gained new urgency because unions appear to be winning an enhanced capacity to demand "a place at the table" when the rules of international trade and investment are being debated (Mazur 2000). This fact was highlighted at the Seattle Conference (1999) of the World Trade Organization where tens of thousands of trade unionists and social activists marched together under the banner, "Teamsters and Turtles Together at Last". Focusing on the International Trade Secretariats (ITSs), as peak union bodies that unite labour internationally by industrial sector, we explore the ways that labour organizations view social clause questions, how the Internationals address the issue of labour rights, and how the various positions of the ITSs can be explained. The argument is presented in two stages. First, key criticisms of the social clause demand are discussed in order to assess the validity of these charges and to set the intellectual context in which the union movement has developed its strategies. Second, the approach of the ITSs and their affiliated unions to the 'social clause' proposal is examined with particular attention being paid to North-South issues and to sectoral differences within the labour movement.

One of the most influential charges advanced in opposition to the social clause demand is that utilising trade instruments to assure respect for rights is unacceptable as it necessarily hampers the movement of goods and services (Litan 2000; Cooke 2000). This is held to be true even in relation to those 'core' rights of labour that the international community, via the International Labour Organization (ILO) and multilateral meetings of Heads of State, has identified as fundamental human rights and that the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) accepts as sufficient content for a WTO social clause, that is:

By limiting the social clause to this core body of rights, unions have been able to counter the claim that they are attempting to impose common minimum wage costs on all nations. In so doing, they have placed their opponents in the position where they must argue against regulations designed to promote respect for basic human rights.

Trade unionists can also point to the fact that the OECD (1996) has concluded that a social clause limited to the core rights of labour would not undermine the competitiveness of developing states. Labour's concessions and the results of the OECD researches, however, have had only limited effect on the strength of the opposition for three reasons. First, the history of colonialism experienced by many developing states has engendered a deep suspicion of the developed world amongst many workers and intellectuals in the South. Second, the dominance of neo-liberal ideas in the media and public debate means that those of good faith who may be receptive to evidence such as that put forward by the OECD are often denied access to such information. Third, a great many of those resisting the demand believe that if it is conceded that trade can be used to assure respect for 'core' rights, a precedent will be established that will open the gate to a vast flood of other claims. The problem with this last reply is that major precedents already exist in the form of the WTO's Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) agreement and the Sanitary and Phyto-sanitary agreement (SPS). These instruments break from the GATT regulatory tradition in that they are concerned with non-trade issues and go beyond merely requiring member states to concede Most Favoured Nation status and national treatment to fellow signatories. Rather, the agreements specify minimum standards that states must impose on producers of goods and services within their own societies if they wish to retain their membership of the WTO.

The SPS agreement establishes rules and disciplines for measures designed to assure human, animal and plant life and health in the areas of food safety and agriculture. It specifies minimum standards relating to quarantine procedures, food processing, inspection rules, and pesticide tolerances. In relation to the social clause debate the key element that makes this agreement of interest is that it sets down minimum standards related to the way products are produced that are designed to protect consumer rights and utilises a trade instrument to police these standards. Of more direct relevance is TRIPS the standards of which derive from World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) conventions that relate to trademarks, geographical indications, industrial designs and the Berne Copyright (1886) and Paris Patent (1883) conventions. The reason intellectual property was brought within the WTO's ambit is because WIPO "lacked an adequate enforcement/dispute settlement mechanism for disputes relating to the conventions under it aegis" (Hoekman 1994, p. 101). As Revesz (1999, p. xii) notes:

TRIPS ... provides clear guidelines about the effective and expeditious enforcement of IPRs - a crucial element that was missing in earlier international agreements. The main objective of TRIPS is to introduce a measure of compulsion (enforceable by sanctions) into the international arena, and in particular to improve IPR [Intellectual Property Rights] protection in developing countries, where in recent years most of the IPR infringement activities tended to occur.

The unenforcability of WIPO conventions mirrors the situation that continues to confront the ILO, in relation to its own conventions.

A great many opponents of a Trade-Related International Labour Standards (TRILS) agreement perceive a vast conceptual distance between WIPO and the ILO, and by implication between the rights of workers and investors. A trade-labour rights link is deemed to be not only a source of inefficiency but also immoral for it imposes developed country standards on developing states that the latter does not want. A trade-investor rights link, by contrast, is deemed a facilitator of growth and is deemed morally just for it is considered only reasonable that property owners should be allowed to enjoy the benefits of ownership (Maskus 2000). As net importers of intellectual property the developing states sought to ensure the Uruguay Round did not include such rights within the ambit of the WTO. They were unsuccessful, however, because the United States government made it clear if the WTO was not given this power it would utilize bilateral and trade sanctions to assure its investors' rights. As a consequence, WIPO became the formulator of standards related to intellectual property rights and the WTO became the enforcer of these rights. By contrast, while U.S.A. trade negotiators mooted the notion that the TRIPS precedent should be extended to embrace the rights of labour they did so with decidedly less enthusiasm. As Braithwaite and Drahos (2000, p. 235) note:

...while linking intellectual property protection to the GATT was important enough for the US to force the issue by bilateral sanctions, such importance and such bilateral aggression has always been lacking in the case of labour standards.

In the face of pressure from organized labour the enthusiasm of the Clinton administration for labour rights strengthened after 1995, a development influenced not least by the significant role organised labour played in the 1996 Presidential elections in the U.S.A. This influence was manifest at the 1999 Seattle conference when President Clinton called for more involvement of non government organisations within the WTO and urged the establishment of a WTO working group that would "make sure that open trade ... respects core labour standards". (cited in Bayne 2000, p. 135) These suggestions were poorly received by many conference delegates and the more so when it was made public that separately he said to the Seattle Post-intelligencer that the working group "should develop these core labour standards ... to be a part of every trade agreement, and ultimately I would favour a system in which sanctions would come for violating any provision of a trade agreement." (cited in Bayne 2000, p. 135). The European Union (EU), South Korea, Turkey, Hungary, South Africa and Japan also indicated a strengthened resolve to promote the labour rights issue within the WTO while clearly attempting to cool the enthusiasm of the Clinton administration. These developments are an important factor explaining the increased willingness of developing country delegates to discuss the labour issue in Seattle. Although it remains the case that the U.S.A. is still unwilling to force the issue in the manner it did with the TRIPS agreement, the changing emphasis in public debates on the subject suggests those promoting the issue are making progress.

The TRIPS agreement is of significance, not only because it establishes a precedent for utilising trade instruments to defend rights, but also because it has begun the "global property epoch", there now being a body of common property law that all states must enforce if they wish to remain members of the international trading community (Cotter 1997; Sell 1998). Already this precedent has motivated investors to attempt to extend the scope of global property rights, via the proposed Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) and this effort was continued at the Seattle conference and can be expected to continue. Indeed, the trade debate is now centring on what new rights should be covered by the WTO minimum standards regime. Thus, the publication The Economist (anon., 2000) and Maskus (2000) argue that TRIPS provides a precedent upon which to build a case for according the WTO the power to enforce the right of multinational investors to access the economies of all nations while Hughes and Wilkinson (1998) insist it justifies incorporation of a labour clause into the legal framework of the WTO.

Given there exists a clear precedent for having the WTO utilise its trade powers to defend basic rights those who claim a social clause would set an unacceptable precedent are disingenuous, unacceptably biased in favour of capital, or unaware of recent major developments in international business regulation. Given the TRIPS precedent, the demand for a TRILS cannot be considered at odds with the new model of international business regulation given birth by the WTO in 1995. Nor can it be viewed as counter to globalism or protectionist. Rather, it is a rights instrument that will ensure the globalisation of rights is not limited to the rights of capital. The lesson observers should draw from the fact that investors were able to have intellectual property rights assured in the Uruguay Round is well put by Maskus (2000, p. 2) when he observes:

IPRs were simply an issue ripe for inclusion in the WTO .... The other broad issues were not similarly positioned, largely because of difficulties in organizing the relevant interests. Thus, the proximate answer to the question of what to include in the next round of negotiations is simply whatever area successfully mounts the associated pressures.

A second charge put forward by opponents of a social clause, is that the demand for a trade-labour link is a Northern ploy that is not supported by the people or the trade unions of the South. Despite the repetition and enthusiasm with which this charge has been advanced it is in fact a gambit designed to divide labour, provide the opponents of a social clause with moral justification for refusing to assure the basic rights of the weak, and a bargaining chip to be offered up in return for trade concessions on the part of the OECD states. That the North-South charge is without substance is shown first by the fact a great many employers and politicians in the North have expressed bitter opposition to the social clause demand. Indeed, when the issue was raised for discussion in the ILO the head of the Employers Group responded that should the ILO endorse a trade-labour rights link the employers would destroy the ILO (Nyland 1999). This division of opinion in the North is mirrored in the South where there is clear diversity both across and within classes. Those who deny this last claim generally do so by offering anecdotal evidence, citing the views of government officials, or pointing to the relatively small number of unionists who have spoken against the social clause demand (Bhagwati 1997; Maitland 1999; Newland 1999 and Krugman 2000). In the case of Krugman the divisiveness of the ploy has been enriched by the assertion that the 'Seattle types' selfishly wish to deny the South the affluence enjoyed by the North. An example of his use of this stratagem appeared in the Bangkok Post on 17th February 2000 in an article titled 'One in the Eye with an American Pie'. The title refers to a demonstration at the Tenth United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) at which a United States fair trade advocate threw a pie at Michel Camdessus the former Head of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Krugman concedes that Thais participated in the demonstrations but accords this fact only passing mention, choosing instead to highlight the fact that a U.S. citizen had thrown the pie. By so doing he gives the impression that social clause advocates are all but universally of the North and the pie thrower another example of those Northerners who would impose "labour and environmental standards on countries that cannot afford them". (Krugman 2000)

By reporting the UNCTAD X demonstrations in this divisive manner, Krugman clouds the fact that Thais made up the overwhelming majority of those who participated in the Bangkok demonstrations. That this was the case is confirmed by one of the authors of this paper who played the part of participant observer at these demonstrations and to whom it was patent that only a miniscule number of Northerners were present. A statement distributed by two local NGOs at the demonstrations clearly expresses their views:

We oppose the promotion and imposition of neoliberal theories and programs incorporating liberalization, selective deregulation, privatization and commercialization of all aspects of human life and endeavors. And we are opposed to the usurping of the roles of national governments and citizens democratic rights by global institutions such as the IMF, World Bank, and the WTO. Instead, we propose the development of a system of global governance that respects local democratic prerogatives and is based on global conventions agreed to at the United Nations. The principles of such a pluralistic and participatory form of international governance must constitute the over-arching principles and regulatory frameworks within which all global, regional, national and local governmental institutions and corporations, and all people, should cooperate. (Civil Society Forum and the Thai Working Group of the Civil Society 2000, pp. 1-2)

This document also argued that inadequately regulated global markets were undermining the employment conditions of Thai workers. It called on UNCTAD affiliated states to both ratify and enforce the core ILO conventions and allow labour "a significant role in designing and deciding on all aspects of trade and development policy." (Civil Society Forum and the Thai Working Group of the Civil Society 2000, p. 2)

Citing the foregoing anecdote regarding the demonstrators at UNCTAD X is instructive but does not indicate the breadth of support that their demand for a voice in the determination of the rules regulating global commerce enjoys amongst the poor of the South. One instrument that does help clarify this issue is a study conducted by the World Bank that surveyed some 60,000 people in sixty developing countries in order to clarify the aspirations of ordinary men and women. Commenting on this study, James Wolfensohn, President of the World Bank Group, has observed:

What is it ... that the poor reply when asked what might make the greatest difference to their lives? They say, organizations of their own so that they may negotiate with government, with traders, and with nongovernmental organizations. Direct assistance through community-driven programs so they may shape their own destinies. Local ownership of funds, so that they may put a stop to corruption ... They long for a system that gives them equity and voice. And if they cannot have this through the ballot box or through government, they want it through informal organization outside government. (Wolfensohn 1999)

The views of the poor of the South and more specifically their views regarding a social clause have also been surveyed by Egger and Schümperli (1996) in a study funded by the Swiss NGOs, Pain Pour le Prochain and La Déclaration de Berne. The study surveyed Southern NGOs and trade unions that actively work with the poor and sixty seven of these bodies responded to the survey: 28 from Latin America; 21 from Asia; 16 from Africa; and two from Eastern Europe. Of the respondents, 80 per cent were either religious (32 per cent) or non-religious NGOs (48 per cent), 13 per cent were trade unions, and 7 per cent research centres. It was found that there was a very high level of support for a social clause amongst the respondents with a very large majority (91 per cent) expressing support for the demand, 7 per cent voicing opposition, and 2 per cent replying in an ambivalent fashion. Supporters recognized the potential for protectionist abuse inherent in a social clause but thought this danger was outweighed by the likely benefits. A great majority also held that the best way to implement a trade-labour agreement was a joint ILO/WTO instrument that would capture the specialist knowledge of the former and the enforcement powers of the latter. In short, those surveyed wanted a version of the TRIPS agreement with a branch of the United Nations defining, promoting and directing implementation of the core conventions while the WTO played the role of enforcer of last resort. In a succinct statement of their findings Egger and Schümperli (1996, p. 8) concluded:

To sum up, the NGOs and trade unions of the South and Eastern Europe which responded to our survey overwhelmingly said yes to the introduction of a social clause in international trade. They consider it an effective means of ensuring respect for workers' fundamental rights and labour conditions. For a majority - often very broad - such a social clause, inseparable from an ecological clause and based mainly on seven key ILO conventions, should be applied at all levels, multilateral, regional, bilateral and private. Particular emphasis, however, was attached to the multilateral level, notably through the creation of a joint ILO/WTO organization. In order to give the social clause a certain reality and effectiveness, most of the organizations recognized the necessity of sanctions, such as denying market access to offending products, and attaching conditions to aid.

Egger and Schümperli's report, at the very least, places an intellectual and moral onus on those who claim the demand for a social clause has no support in the South to present evidence that is equally substantive. That some NGO organizations that work in the South oppose a social clause is not to be denied. At Seattle a number of such organizations were vocal but so too were a large number of pro-labour standards NGOs. Further research may find different results from those produced by Egger and Schümperli but it should be clear and accepted that the debate has moved beyond those who simply assert that the poor of the developing world are opposed to a social clause.

As valuable as is the work of Egger and Schümperli, it remains the case that it primarily reports the perspective of Southern NGOs rather than the views of Southern worker organisations. Recognizing this is the case we now turn to the second section of this paper, which explores the strategies being developed by the international trade union movement to enhance workers' capacity to gain a voice in the formulation of the rules of globalization. We do so by exploring the views of key exemplars of the trade union movement, the ITSs. While the ICFTU is regarded as the peak body that unites trade unionists globally, the twelve Internationals organise unions along sectoral lines. Clarifying the views of these bodies in both Asia and Europe has the advantage that it captures both geographic and industrial diversity. To achieve this goal we examined union publications and conducted in-depth interviews with key officials from the ICFTU and four ITSs (thirteen in all), between January and July 2000. The four internationals selected were chosen because they have been active in the international labour rights debate as well as reflecting the range of industrial sectors, these being - Education International (EI); International Federation of Chemical, Energy, Mine and General Workers' Union (ICEM); International Textile, Garment and Leather Workers' Federation (ITGLWF); Public Services International (PSI). The scope of the study required the authors to largely focus on the views of unions as reported by the ITSs, with the implication that there may be a tendency to underwrite union unity and minimise the nuances between unions on these questions.

Union positions on the social clause proposal appear to be driven by international bodies and not by grassroots union organizations. This was a point freely conceded by one interviewee who observed: "[Unions] are not putting more resources into this. They don't see it as a first priority" (Interview, PSI-AP, March 2000). However, influence does not only flow downwards for the views of regional confederations and individual unions must be taken into consideration by the centre if it is to achieve the active support needed to successfully promote the demand. Four alternate positions on the 'social clause' can be identified within the union movement with the first being unreserved support for the proposal - a position expressed by three of the four ITSs interviewed (Interview, PSI-AP, March 2000; Interview, EI-AP, March 2000; Interview, ITGLWF-TWARO, May 2000; Interview, EI, June 2000; EI 1998).

A second group accord sceptical support to the proposal but doubt it can be achieved. This group is made up of some of the affiliates of the same ITSs, which express unconditional support for the social clause proposal. One regional PSI official, for example, indicated that "trade unions are not looking at the WTO as a friendly organisation" (Interview, March 2000). At the same time the unions recognise that their current structures, such as the ILO, lack "teeth" (Interview, PSI-AP, March 2000). Given these doubts the sceptics tend to support the social clause in principle but are averse to apportioning significant resources to promoting the demand.

According to both the ITSs and the ICFTU officials interviewed, these first two groups make up a significant majority of trade unions in both the North and the South. In contrast, a third smaller group refuses to support the social clause demand on strategic grounds. ICEM and most of its affiliates fall into this category. One ICEM leader observed that "[t]here are many reservations about the WTO because the mainstream economists of the WTO are liberal market economists" (Interview, ICEM-AP, February 2000). Compared with the second group of unions, this group has similar but more pronounced concerns about the nature of the WTO and these concerns have resulted in different strategic priorities. ICEM and many of its affiliates, for example, hold that a more effective globalisation strategy is to engage in direct campaigns for agreements with Transnational Corporations (TNCs) and Codes of Conduct. Further, they hold that unless emphasis is placed on local union struggle a social clause will be of marginal value. An Asia-Pacific ICEM leader, for example claimed that little could be won by international pressure that is not complemented by a high level of domestic struggle (Interview, ICEM-AP, February 2000).

The fourth group of unions objects to a social clause in principle. In terms of the two regions studied, the Asia-Pacific and Europe, the small number of unions falling into this category were located in South Asia (India, Pakistan), South East Asia (Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia), and China (Interview, PSI-AP, March 2000; Interview, EI-AP, March 2000; Interview, ITGLWF-TWARO, May 2000). The reasons these unions oppose a social clause vary with some merely reflecting the fact that they are creatures of government while others genuinely believe the demand is inherently protectionist, will have dire consequences for particular industries and economies in the South, and is nothing less than an imperialist tool for imposing the views of the North on developing countries (Interview, PSI-AP, March 2000; Interview, EI, June 2000).

The Internationals indicated that the extent of union independence from governments and the level of exposure of local unions to the international labour movement greatly influence union positions on the social clause. Further, they hold that these factors very much determine the extent to which unions accept the arguments advanced by self-styled free-trade intellectuals and their governments. Consequently, sensitivity to the need to overcome these influences is clearly manifest in ICFTU literature on the social clause. An EI official made the importance with which this issue is perceived explicit:

there were many governments who had meetings with their unions in their country to tell them that what was being talked was a minimum wage world-wide which of course they could never afford to pay and then there would be sanctions and boycotts against their country so we had to counter a great deal of that. (Interview, EI, June 2000)

To address this approach, EI has been promoting an understanding of trade union and broader human rights issues on a regional basis while the ICFTU has repeatedly argued that all "industrialised country governments should actively demonstrate their commitment to improve core labour standards through enhanced trade incentives and development assistance in this area." (ICFTU 2000b)

While the great majority of trade unions support a social clause, none view it as a sufficient means for promoting the globalisation of labour standards. Thus, even those unions and ITSs that give the demand unreserved support invariably insist it must be part of a broader global strategy. While they campaign for a social clause, ITSs are also developing other mechanisms including the negotiation of individual and sectoral agreements with multinational corporations and governments, the promotion of Codes of Conduct and the lobbying of individual governments. The first approach places considerable emphasis on developing global agreements with individual corporations that focus on labour rights, health and safety, environmental practices, and training. To date, ICEM has achieved agreements with the multinationals Statoil and Freudenberg (ICEM, 2000c) and a number of other agreements are under negotiation. This approach was a major theme of the Second World Congress of ICEM held in Durban in November 1999. As part of a drive to "build a global trade unionism" and "promote the cause of unity and common struggle between workers of every land" the ITS enunciated a plan that involved:

Negotiating global agreements, between ICEM affiliate unions organized within a company's worldwide operations and senior management, incorporating recognition of workers' right to organize and collective bargaining and other ILO core conventions, common 'best practice' standards for health, safety and environmental protection throughout the company, joint training in the application and implementation of these principles and the development of regular monitoring and enforcement procedures. (ICEM, 1999, p. 6)

In part, this is a pragmatic response to membership diversity as well as the expression of a distinct strategy. One official (Interview, ICEM, June 2000) freely conceded the fact that the diversity of views amongst affiliated unions in relation to the social clause proposal had influenced its decision to give priority to a direct action strategy.

This [difference of union stance] is an aspect that has been involved in much of our trade policy, it became a factor there, so that we, when we are discussing World Trade Organisation, GATT agreements, we get to the situation where some European countries are driving for social prosperity very forcefully and then the Asia Pacific countries, such as India, Malaysia, are against that. In some case also we have difficulties with our unions there, who see it as a possible protectionist view. So what we have really been concentrating on is two issues ... global agreements [with multinationals] on human rights, health and safety, environmental practice, training ... Then the other question are the sectoral agreements. (Interview, ICEM, June 2000)

The representatives of ICEM (Interview, ICEM-AP, February 2000; Interview, ICEM, June 2000) and the European Public Services Union (EPSU) (Interview, June 2000), effectively the European voice of PSI, also discussed their attempts to develop sectoral agreements. In particular, ICEM reported that an agreement is being negotiated in the chemical industry that will enshrine 'Responsible Care' programs (ICEM, 2000c) that have been developing internationally since the Bhopal disaster though these programs do not include the core ILO conventions.

A second strategic approach focused on Codes of Conduct or Practice that bind a company to recognise labour rights. The EPSU, for example, has developed a Code of Conduct for water companies, which it is attempting to put it into effect, although with limited success (Interview, EPSU, June 2000). To date, only the Welsh company Hyder (subsequently taken over by Western Power Distribution Limited) has signed up to the Code. The difficulty appears to be the expansiveness of provisions presented in these Codes. As a result, the EPSU has begun to rethink the content of such Codes, increasingly developing a focus that is solely on workers' rights. Codes of Conduct are also being promoted by the Textile Workers' Asia Regional Office (TWARO), the Asia Pacific Regional arm of the ITGLWF (Interview, ITGLWF-TWARO, May 2000). However, TWARO insists Codes of Conduct alone are no substitute for a mechanism linking labour rights and trade:

you can have all the Codes of Practice that you like, nothing will do anything to protect these people's entitlements like a Social Clause will because a Social Clause has actually got some oomph and a Trade Agreement, and then countries legislate to ensure that these things are complied with. (Interview, ITGLWF-TWARO, May 2000)

A third way by which unions are seeking to promote international labour standards is by lobbying individual governments. An EI official, for example, reported that teachers' organizations in many countries have led this movement especially in the area of child labour (Interview, June 2000). While ICEM focuses its attention on multinationals rather than governments the Asia Pacific Regional Secretary of ICEM (Interview, February 2000) was emphatic that it was critical that unions also pressure their governments to adopt and enforce the regulations needed to ensure labour rights are paid due respect.

In the debate about the social clause proposal the ICFTU has acquired a lead role in relation to the ITSs. Its officials insist the degree of effort directed towards the issue is justified given support for the demand is widespread amongst its affiliates and opposition is confined to small pockets in a handful of countries. Its active program has been developed against the background of concern regarding the ineffectual role it played at the Singapore Meeting of the WTO in 1996 where the WTO formally rejected the demand for a social clause (Interview, EI, June 2000). The ICFTU responded to the criticism it received from affiliates by devoting significant resources to the promotion of a link between labour and trade and by focusing on the building of an ongoing campaign. A discussion document produced by an ICFTU/ITS Task Force on Trade, Investment and Labour Standards in February 2000, reveals that the campaign is multi-layered involving work with media, civil society and employers' organizations; multilateral organizations; governments; and non-trade related fora (ICFTU 2000c). It also involves a division of labour that is designed to build consensus behind the campaign for global labour rights and to capture the divergent strengths of the differing sectors of the labour movement.

There is an agreement that the ICFTU take the lead in WTO matters. We use the expertise of the ITSs and it makes sense for them to handle some of the sectoral discussions themselves, like PSI is taking the lead on the health sector discussions now, EI on the education, UNI on the financial services aspects of the WTO, for example. So there's that sort of sectoral sort of breakdown when it comes to a particular sector specific issue. But when it comes to the overall issue of labour standards and some of the institutional questions about the WTO, dispute settlement procedures, and NGO representational rights and so on, then its accepted at the ICFTU that they'd do that. I think also we do that well because it is I think more and more our number one priority in terms of international economic policy. (Interview, ICFTU, June 2000)

While the ICFTU has largely taken carriage of the broader promotion and development of the proposed link, it has actively sought to involve other labour organizations at all levels. Through 1999 it conducted a programme of seminars throughout the regions, actively encouraged greater involvement of individual confederations and unions in the campaign and in 2000 undertook "further work with those developing country trade unions that have continuing questions about the merits of a workers' rights clause to try and convince them to become more supportive of the issue." (ICFTU 2000c, p. 12) This inclusive approach is appreciated by the Internationals in both the centre and within the regions:

I think that the process that [the ICFTU] have developed [in relation to trade and labour standards] has been a very inclusive one. It has allowed us all to you know be part of the process. I think it's why it's got such wide, wide support throughout the ITS community. (Interview, EI, June 2000; the Asia Pacific Regional Coordinator expressed similar views, Interview, March 2000)

The positions taken by the ITSs as representative organizations of trade unions toward the social clause are complicated and complex and are grounded in the politics of trade unionism at an international level. They reflect both internal divisions and diversity across regions and varied experiences of social clause themes. In addition, there is an evolving relationship in process between the ITSs, as sectorally-based organizations, and the ICFTU, as it repositions itself in the current political moment. The outcome is a more complicated picture of union social clause activity than has thus far been presented in any commentaries on this debate.

The social clause issue has often been presented as a case of North versus South. Clearly, the trade unions that oppose the demand on principle are concentrated in the 'South' though even in the developing countries unions opposed to a social clause are in a minority. Indeed, most international trade union bodies located in the South argue that the provisions the ICFTU wishes to include in the social clause demand are particularly relevant to the South as it is Southern workers who are more likely to be denied basic human rights. Consequently, ITSs located in the Asia Pacific Region applaud the efforts of their central bodies and report that without international union influence and information, local trade unions would have little ability to counter the arguments of their own governments regarding protectionism or sustain the hope that one day labour reform will be achieved - a requirement without which it is all but impossible to continue the struggle (Interview, PSI-AP, March 2000; Interview, EI-AP, March 2000). As one respondent indicated:

As far as PSI is concerned, ... most of the affiliates try to, okay, try to accept [the value of a social clause]. Because they know that they don't have the rights and they have not seen any success ... they know that if such a thing exists it will bring success but they are not willing to risk, to take a big stand on this ... they feel that even if they take a stand it will take such a long time before they can ever get such a thing and before that time they may not have much progress done locally ... so they want to be sure how to take the step. And we are unable to have enough coordination and solidarity around to convince them, look, this is how it will be done. So most of the time when we discuss it they are able to support it. They say: all right, yeah, we support that. So we try our best. (Interview, PSI-AP, March 2000; similar sentiments expressed by EI March 2000)

It is evident the industrial character of unions influences their attitude to the proposed social clause and that a major determinant shaping their perspective is the alternative strategies made available by the nature of the industries they cover. ITSs evaluate the resources required for campaigning, the likelihood of success and the prospect of undesirable by-products or opportunity costs. They decide on their strategic approaches accordingly and as a consequence do not always give high priority to the social clause proposal. Taking the question of sectors first, it is worth recalling that the ITSs are broadly-based union confederations, located according to sector. Thus, particular ITSs, such as the PSI and EI, are located in the public services (or former public services) while others such as ICEM cover a cluster of industrial concerns, such as chemicals and energy. One feature of this difference is that some sectors are characterised by a direct engagement with the internationalisation of economies, such as the finance sector, while others remain nationally-based and to a large extent nationally-focused. A concurrent feature is that some ITSs bargain largely with governments while others deal with multinationals, and yet others such as the ITGLWF deal with a combination of multinational corporations and relatively small nationally-based employers.

The occupational base of unions further compounds sectoral diversity. To illustrate, the EI is broadly representative of teachers and related educationalists around the world. In this respect, it is not a union that represents a membership characterised by child labour or manual labour. In contrast, the ICEM is broadly representative of workers employed in multinationals, with the implication that in many developing countries these are relatively well-paid workers, compared with other sections of the national workforce. One consequence is that the differences often seen in national trade union movements, at least historically, are also visited on the international confederations.

These two features of international unionism, draw attention to a critical condition for developing and constructing union strategy in relation to the social clause and trade agreements. The following matrix (Table 1) summarises and helps explain these different positions:

ITS	Occupational Base	Employer	Strategies
ICEM and ITGLWF	Mainly manual	Multinationals	Global agreements/ Codes of Conduct
PSI	Manual and Non-manual	State and multinationals	Codes of Conduct
EI	Non-manual	State (some private)	Lobbying

Broadly speaking, the different stances taken by union confederations to the social clause question were influenced by the employer with whom the confederation bargains. In the case of a confederation such as ICEM, the confederation and affiliates contract mainly with multinational corporations. As a result, this confederation has looked past the social clause proposal, arguing for the recognition of labour rights in the form of sectoral and multinational agreements. While the number of agreements signed to date are miniscule the strategy has provided the occasion for the union confederation to begin to review how it organises and operates as an international union. In contrast, such an option is not available to a confederation such as the EI, which deals with national governments, and attempts to develop a robust form of public sector unionism, in the varied conditions of public sector employment in the modern state. Consequently, the position taken by the EI and similar unions reflects their belief that while trade liberalization may currently have a limited effect on their members, it is a focal point where pressure for broad labour reform can be focussed. Qualifying this set of arrangements is the emergent spheres of responsibility between the ITSs on the one hand and the ICFTU on the other. In part, this is a reflection of the repositioning that is taking place within and of the ICFTU as it addresses the reality of the post-cold war polity and of the fact that ITSs do not deal directly with supra-state agencies and fora such as the WTO. As a result, it is necessary to distinguish both between the remit of different union confederations as well as their basis as union organizations, differentially located.

One feature of union structure and practice that should be taken into consideration is the degree of direct accountability between member organisations within countries and the international confederation. Put baldly, the distance from grass roots activism and the breadth of their respective constituencies in part influences one feature of the emphases given to the social clause debate by these union organisations. A social clause, for example, would apply equally across all countries, industries and occupations and in this sense is a more manageable endeavour for the ICFTU than would be an attempt to discern and address the specific needs of sub-sets of its membership. The ITSs on the other hand are directly answerable to those sub-sets and thus have different priorities. One outcome is that these confederations have developed distinctive strategies in relation to the social clause demand, from each other, and with respect to the ICFTU, partly in relation to their different social bases and sectoral concerns.

The question facing trade unions in the current period is what is the best strategy for developing an effective voice that can provide labour a place at the table when the rules of globalisation are being debated. Central to this issue is the demand for a social clause, which has become a touchstone for the articulation of an approach to trade union campaigning, that is international. The interviews have revealed that there is a significant divergence of views within the international union movement on this issue. A significant majority of unions express support with the number rejecting the demand on principle being limited to a handful of countries and even within these states there tends to be a wide divergence of views. The range and proportional distribution of perspectives suggests that while the anti-protectionist and North-South arguments put forward by opponents of a trade-labour link have influenced the views of unionists in both the North and South only a small minority of unionists fully embrace these views - a result similar to that reported by Egger and Schümperli (1996).

The study of the trade union internationals has also revealed that the social clause demand does not differ fundamentally from precedents already established by the international community and accepted as a condition of membership of the WTO. Further, it has been shown that the social clause debate cannot be explained simply in North-South terms and that union assessment and involvement in this debate is much more nuanced and differentiated than has been suggested by most commentators to date. Finally, the study suggests that it is necessary to take the analysis further. By examining the position of a wider body of ITSs and the way that they and their affiliated unions have developed critical and worked out perspectives of the social clause in the many regions not covered in this study, a broader account of international trade unionism can be presented. Although this paper presents the first steps in this task, it should remind all analysts of the need to consider the complex basis of trade unionism in contemporary society, as collective organizations, pursuing the varied interests of workers and their communities in the very trying circumstances of the globalisation of economies. In taking these steps trade unions are addressing some of the most compelling issues today. The pathway they face is likely to remain uncertain and contested, within and beyond the trade union movement.

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